SUSAN WOLCOTT*
Newly collected data on India's textile industry over the years 1921-38 show strike rates far higher than those observed in the British or U.S. textile industries when they were at a similar stage of development, despite an absence of formal union organiza tion or state support for collective bargaining. Colonial India's high strike frequency is hard to account for in terms of current theories of strikes and collective action in general. The author believes that these data may point to the important role of social norms of cooperation in sustaining collective action. r I ^ here are many historical studies of strike -* behavior in the industrialization of the now rich countries, but almost no quantita tive studies of strikes in the initial industrial development of poor countries. In this paper, I examine a rich and relatively underused data source on Indian cotton textile strikes occurring in 1921-38. These data provide a unique opportunity to systematically study strike activity in a poor country with a largely unorganized labor force.1 I develop the first statistics on strike frequency and duration in pre-independence India, and compare these data with comparable historical statistics from the United States and Britain. I find that strike frequencies in India were unusually high.
*The author is Associate Professor of Economics, Binghamton University. She thanks John Conlon, Price Fishback, Joyce Jacobsen, Stanley Masters, and partici pants at seminars at the University of Mississippi, North western University, Binghamton University, and Rhodes College, as well as at the 1999 Economic History Associa tion Meetings in Baltimore, for their comments.
A data appendix with additional results, and copies of the computer programs used to generate the results presented in the paper, are available from the author at P.O. Box 6000, Binghamton, NY13902-6000; swolcott? binghamton.edu.
^his study complements other quantitative studies of historical strikes, which include Currie and Ferrie (2000) , Friedman (1998) , Rosenbloom (1998), Card and Olson (1995) , and Edwards (1981) .
I consider possible explanations of this high strike incidence in light of modern theories of collective action and strikes.
Such a study is of obvious interest for labor historians. But there is a wider significance. Exploring the applicability of modern strike theories in an institutional environment far removed from the one for which they were developed will lead to a more thorough un derstanding of what is universal and what is particular about these theories.
The Data
India's modern cotton textile industry began in the city of Bombay in the 1850s, and by the 1920s there were mills in many parts of India. The Bombay City industry experienced consistent growth to 1922, but there was a sharp downturn from 1922 to to the strikes by the Labour investigators appear reasonable in the early years where details are given, I assume they are similarly reasonable in later years.
I am the first to use these data to calcu late the number of strikes per year, average strike duration, total number of days lost to strikes, and fraction of successful strikes (or, rather, the fraction recorded as success ful by the Gazette). The Gazette data do not include the size of the mill's labor force. To compute strike rates per mill, per worker, and per region, days lost to strikes (the number of workers striking times the length of the strikes) per worker and per mill, and measures of mill-wide strike participation, that is, the fraction of the mill's work force affected by the strike, I combine the Gazette data with data in the Bombay Millowners' Association Annual Report. This source lists the name, location, and average annual inputs, includ ing labor, for each of the individual mills in India. Using the mill names and locations from both sources, I was able to link the individual mill strike data from the Gazette with data on each mill's average annual labor force from the Report.
To be interpreted, the Indian data need to be put into perspective. There are, however, no similar data from other poor countries. Aggregated textile strike data are available for the United States and Britain for the period of observation (the 1920s and 1930s) , and with these data I can make some cross-country comparisons, such as for annual number of days lost to strikes per worker. But the most similar and comparable data sets were actu ally collected in the United States and Britain in the 1880s and 1890s (see data appendix). An important advantage of the disaggregated nineteenth-century U.S. and British data is that they allow me to construct measures of strike success and mill participation, as I did for India. As I argue in a subsequent section, these two aspects of strikes may be especially important in understanding relative strike frequencies across the countries.
Fortunately, the 1880s and 1890s in the United States and England are a particularly suitable period for my comparison?better suited than the interwar period would be if data were available. There are two reasons for this. First, as some studies show that strike frequencies in a given industry rise when that industry's labor market is slack (McConnell 1990; Tracy 1986) , it is better to compare periods with a similar employment pattern. Indian employment in the 1920s and 1930s was steady, with consistent though small growth in the regions outside Bombay City. In the same period, employment in England and the United States was unstable, affected by the Great Depression and other factors. The rate of employment growth in England and the United States in the 1880s and 1890s, in contrast, was similar to rates in Indian Presidency 1921 -1938 Bombay 1921 -1938 Ahmedabad [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] Elsewhere (upcountry) The main conclusion one can draw from Table 1 is that Presidency strikes were much more frequent than either English or Ameri can strikes. The nineteenth-century cotton textile workers in England struck 0.8 days per year, and those in the United States 1.4 days per year. Even in the turbulent interwar period, the days lost to strikes per year per worker in cotton textiles rose only to 1.8 in England and to 2.36 in the United States, compared to 23 in the Bombay Presidency.
Many of these strikes occurred in Bombay City. But even in the upcountry, where employment growth was continuous, each worker could expect to strike over 6 days per year?much less than in Bombay City, but much more than in the United States or England. Similarly, each year 28% of all mills in the Bombay Presidency and 15% of mills in the upcountry experienced a strike, compared to about 3% of firms in nineteenth century England and America and 7% of firms in Massachusetts alone. About 4% of workers were typically involved in a strike each year in the nineteenth century in the United States and England. Massive interwar restructuring of industries raised that number in the two countries to 10% and 9%, respectively. In the Presidency, the corresponding figure was 41%; it was 17%, on average, in the economi cally healthy upcountry firms. other regions, and these mills were among the largest in the data set. Solidarity translated into labor victories, at least in India. Table 2 reports the mean and median participation rates and strike length for the set of disaggregated strikes broken down by strike outcome. These outcome categories were determined subjectively by bureaucrats in their respective countries. However, Card and Olson (1995:33) , examin ing a subset of the 1881-86 U.S. strikes from the Labor Commissioner's Reports, which is also my source for U.S. data, found that wage strikes classified by contemporaneous bureaucrats as a "success" were in fact associ ated with significant wage gains, while failed strikes tended to be associated with no wage change. Card and Olson also found that in wage strikes in the United States the fraction of a firm's labor force involved in a strike had a strong positive effect on workers' ability to get what they demanded. The authors specu lated that this fraction measured workers' ability to present management with a united front. The figures in Table 2 indicate that in India "management wins" were associated with lower average and median participation in all three regions. In England, the rate of strike participation was nearly 100% regard less of outcome. In the U.S. textile strikes, "compromise" results were associated with higher average and median participation rates, though "labor wins" were not. No pattern is apparent for Massachusetts. But when we consider union-authorized strikes as a proportion of all strikes, an interesting pattern emerges in the United States and
Massachusetts. Sixteen percent of U.S. strikes overall, and 15% of Massachusetts strikes, were union-authorized. These strikes come much closer to Indian participation rates.
And in Massachusetts, union-authorized strikes approached English success levels.
To get a more exact estimate of the effect of labor participation on strike success in India, I estimated probit equations of the probability of a strike ending with some thing other than a "management win" for each region. These regressions included strike participation, strike duration, and year dummies. The results are reported in Table 3 . The estimated signs on the coefficients confirm what the aggregate statistics sug gested. Strike participation increased the probability that management would not win, and strike duration had very little effect on the result. The estimated coefficients for strike participation are statistically and qualitatively significant for both Bombay and Ahmedabad. The estimated probit coefficients suggest that in Ahmedabad, as participation moved from 41% to 80%, the probability that management would not win moved from 15% to 20%. In Bombay the result is slightly stronger: as participation moved from 35% to 89%, the probability that management would not win moved from 15% to 25%. The estimated coefficient is smaller and not significant at conventional levels for the upcountry regions of the Presidency, but one might speculate that this is because in those regions, just as in the very heavily unionized English industry, strike participa tion was very high in all strikes.
The disaggregated strike data also allow me to estimate hazard functions. The hazard rate is the probability of a strike settling on a particular day given that it has lasted to this point (Kiefer 1988 (1) X(t)=yata-\ where X is the hazard rate as a function of t} and a and y are parameters. A higher y shifts up the intercept of the hazard function, and a higher a decreases the absolute value of the slope. That is, a higher y suggests strikes will more likely settle sooner, and a higher a (in the limit equal to 1) suggests that strike settlement rates are less negatively dura A high hazard rate indicates a high probability of settlement. The Presidency hazard rates are virtually identical to the Massachusetts rates. Figure 1 indicates that the likelihood of a settlement in the first week was much higher for all three historical series than for large modern strikes. After two months, however, strikers in Massachu setts and the Bombay Presidency were just States. They did so in Bombay City, where employment was declining, but they also struck more frequently in the expanding upcountry. Further, they struck in what ap pears to have been an organized fashion, at least relative to U.S. workers.
How can we explain this? Why strikes occur at all is not obvious. They involve great cost to the individual, and any payoff constitutes a public good for the work force of the firm.
Gains for workers garnered by the strike are available to striking and non-striking workers alike. Each individual would have a strong incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others, and if the labor market is perfectly competitive and workers can move freely across firms, it should be hard to sustain a coalition of striking workers. Even if workers could somehow combine into an organized force, strikes waste resources, and thus should not occur. In explaining why Indian work ers struck so frequently, I will consider the role of politics, and also economic models of asymmetric information. In the latter section, I will particularly explore the role of union leaders in eliminating uncertainty, and the role of social norms of reciprocity in sustaining collective action.
Political Explanations
One explanation for why strikes occur even if they waste resources is that they are an expression of "collective voice." Strike frequencies and durations are explained by the complete behavioral context, not exclud ing economic forces, but also including social measures such as the degree of management's challenge to fairness and legitimacy. In this view, discontent and social solidarity cause strikes (Godard 1992 ).
Discontent and solidarity might have been on the rise in interwar India because of in creased political activism during the thrust toward independence. Perhaps the relative frequency of Indian strikes was a manifesta tion of the politicization of the Indian work force.2 Only three of the over 1,000 strikes are listed as having political causes, and the 2One potential link between politics and cotton textile strikes can be ruled out easily. In the annual meeting of longest of these lasted just four days. But Tilly (1989:11) wrote that even so-called "economic" strikes, which he acknowledged constitute the vast majority of strikes, have a political aspect. "The political implications of strikes lay rather in their legal context, their tendency to rise and fall as a function of the political strength of labor, and their potential as a weapon in regional and national struggles for power" (italics mine).
But the importance of nationalist politics in the relative frequency of Indian strikes is not obvious. Strikes feature prominently in many discussions of Independence agitation, but it seems more likely that strikes were used opportunistically by leaders of the National ist movement as a weapon in their political maneuvering than that strikes were directly caused by political issues. First, political agi tators were not vital in leading labor. There were political leaders who became involved in labor disputes. But an examination of any of the strikes shows that these were not cases of politicians mobilizing workers. Rather, the workers initiated a strike, and once it had begun, political leaders either volunteered, or were requested by the workers to represent them. Chadavarkar (1998:266-326) claimed that nationalist agitators exaggerated their role in workers' resistance. He believed workers' solidarity stemmed from workers' own growing perception of their shared economic sphere.
Congress in December 1920, Gandhi declared a boycott of all things British, specifically highlighting imported British cotton cloth. Indians were to rely on svadeshi, or native, cottons, preferably hand-woven cloth made from hand-spun thread. One might think there was a connection between the boycott and Indian labor unrest. But the majority of the Bombay City mill own ers were themselves Indian, and foreign mill owners outside of Bombay city were very rare. Furthermore, strike incidence was no higher in the Bombay City mills with foreign owners than in those with native owners. It is more difficult to evaluate the relationship between the nationality of managers and strike incidence, but one scrap of evidence is provided by Rutnagur's (1925) listing of the nationality of the managers of Bombay City mills over one year. Over the 1920s, the 28 mills Rutnagur listed as having a foreign manager did not have higher strike incidence than did the 49 mills with native managers.
One might still argue that the Nationalist movement contributed to this perception. Haimson (1989:525) argued that there is a connection for workers between "the issue of control over the character and pace of their own work and their position in the polity as a whole." But can the increase in political agitation in India explain why strike incidence in interwar India was so much greater than it was in interwar Britain and the United States? The interwar period was a time of heightened political tension and rising labor consciousness in those coun tries as well. Freeman (1998) credited the unusually strong 1930s spurt in unionization in the United States and elsewhere, includ ing the United Kingdom, to a widespread "loss of faith in business leadership." That the political environment generated by the Nationalist movement increased Indian work ers ' willingness to strike seems possible; that it made these workers 10 times as radical as the fairly radical interwar British and U.S. workers seems less likely.
Asymmetric Information
If politics alone cannot explain the greater Indian strike frequencies, what are the po tential economic explanations? Most labor economists now argue that strikes occur when there is a breakdown in bargaining between industrialists and organized labor due to asymmetric information (Kennan 1986; Kennan and Wilson 1989) . A strike is viewed as a mechanism that conveys cred ible information to the less informed party. Employees cannot be certain of the marginal profit of labor. Employers cannot be certain of the reservation wage of labor. Neither side can be certain of the other's delay cost of striking, or their degree of selfishness, or their subjective evaluation of equity. Accord ing to the asymmetric information model, strikes are not a waste of resources. They are a justified expenditure.
When striking workers are not members of an established union, uncertainty is increased for two reasons. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) stressed the role of relatively well in formed union leaders in conveying informa tion concerning actual business conditions to the rank and file. In their model, strikes occur because the union leaders do not have complete credibility. But in the absence of unions, this conduit for information is entirely absent. Uncertainty regarding busi ness conditions is exacerbated. Further, the absence of a secure union presents an entirely new source of uncertainty. In these cases, the strike itself may be used to resolve workers' uncertain collective bargaining status. Card and Olson (1995) first pointed to this role of strikes in their study of late nineteenth-century U.S. strikes, and argued that a particular type of asymmetric model, war-of-attrition, is most appropriate for ex plaining the behavior of firms and workers as workers establish credibility in bargaining.
In this model, each player has a delay cost that is known only to him; the other player only knows the distribution of his opponent's delay cost. This theoretical uncertain delay cost is equivalent to the actual uncertainty over the support workers will give to a strike when there is little or no control by an estab lished union leadership. In the formulation considered by Card and Olson, the marginal cost of delay is constant, so that for player i with a daily delay cost of c., the cost of a strike of duration t is c. t. A player continues the fight so long as the total expected delay costs in the future are less than or equal to the value of the "prize" that is being fought over.
The prize can be considered as the higher wage being asked for, the avoidance of a wage decrease, or any of the other conditions labor is either demanding or protesting. A strike ends when at least one of the players capitulates. The player with the lower delay cost always wins, and thus the strike outcome resolves the initial uncertainty over relative delay costs.
It is interesting that war-of-attrition models are the only asymmetric information strike models that predict duration dependence.
In the other models, settlement rates are in dependent of duration (Kennan and Wilson 1989:s98 The difference in relative delay costs be tween the bargaining players affects strike incidence in war-of-attrition models. Nale buff and Riley (1985) proved that in war-of attrition models, where one player's delay costs are much larger than the other's, the former will be "very passive" in comparison with the latter, though this passivity will result in zero strikes only for certain distributions of the delay costs. Intuitively, one would ex pect that even though exact delay costs are unknown to the other player, if both players know that the distribution of player 1 's delay costs lies largely above that of player 2, the low probability of success for player 1 will greatly decrease the expected value of player 1 's gains from a strike, and consequently strikes would seldom be worthwhile for player 1.
These models suggest that the relative frequency of the Indian, English, and U.S. strikes might be explained either by differing levels of uncertainty in the three countries, or by factors that altered the relative delay costs of the two parties to the strike. It is unlikely quitting times is inversely related to the function mapping observed waiting times to types. As the dispute's dura tion lengthens, only low-delay-cost (high-prize-value) types remain, and so the hazard rate (the conditional probability of settling) falls.
that an absolutely higher underlying lev uncertainty regarding business condit was responsible for the high Indian strike dence in the 1920s and 1930s relative to s incidence in the United States and Engl All three countries' industries operated very competitive international market, thus the underlying business shocks in 1920s and 1930s in India, England, and United States were similar. India adju best to these shocks, as indicated by the severe variations in employment. But I explore the institutional framework social environment of the three coun to identify factors that may have miti information asymmetries or facilitated c tive action and thus altered strike incid even in the presence of similar under levels of uncertainty.
The Legal Environment
An obviously relevant factor is the l environment. Governments set the rule the game. If the institutions favor work then workers' expected prize rises and, ce paribus, one would expect more strikes. first laws governing collective action in date from the interwar period. In the Bo Presidency, legislation formally legal strikes and unions did not appear until 1 And even though unions were now legal, fir were not required to recognize or negot with them. Government mediation occu on an ad hoc basis (Kumar 1961 (Rayback 1966:91) . The Clayton Act of 1914 formally legalized unions, and gave them at least nominal protection from liability under the Sherman anti-trust laws, though as Rayback (1966:295) showed, the actual protection offered by the Act was limited. The most important point of simi larity between the United States and India was that management was not required to recognize or bargain with unions in either country. This changed in the United States after the creation of the National Labor Re lations Board in 1934 and promulgation of the Wagner Act (which legalized the NLRB codes) in 1935.
The legal environment of late-nineteenth century Massachusetts seems very close to that of interwar India. According to Bedford (1995) , the Massachusetts political and legal community of that period was genuinely concerned with workers' position. Rayback (1966) showed that this concern was not universal among U.S. jurists of this period.
But Bedford noted that even the adminis trators of the Massachusetts Bureau of the Statistics of Labor were somewhat distrustful of unions. This institutional ambiguity was also characteristic of interwar India.
The countries' legal environments, as summarized above, would lead us to expect 4This is similar to Currie and Ferrie's (2000) and British textile workers struck seldom.
Indian workers were overwhelmingly male, and committed to lifetime employment in the industry. The U.S. and British labor force were more mixed, but were majority female. A large proportion of female workers is typically considered a deterrent to strike activity, perhaps because female workers' lack of commitment to the industry reduces the expectation of the prize to be won by organiz ing.5 But though they were majority female, the textile industries of Britain and the United States were among the most militant labor forces in those countries if measured in terms of annual strike days per worker. For the United States, Edwards (1981:155) listed the days lost per worker to strikes by industry for the years 1927-40. The average days lost per year for the 21 industries listed was 1.3. The figure for textiles in these years was 1.6. Only coal, with 1.9 days lost to strikes per worker per year, significantly outstripped textiles on this measure, but even that figure is dwarfed by the Indian days lost data.
For the United Kingdom, I have construct ed decadal averages of days lost to strikes from 1891 to 1938 for selected industries (Table5). I chose these industries for comparison with 5This lack of lifetime commitment could explain the more persistent resistance to speed-up demonstrated by Indian workers than by the largely teenage female Japa nese labor force (Wolcott 1994) , as well as the relative scarcity of women in nineteenth-century English union leadership positions (Turner 1962:293-94 Indian textile workers belonged to a labor union in 1924, which is comparable to U.S. union membership rates in textiles in the same period.7 But Indian unions were typi cally no more than strike committees, with "about as much life as the letterheads which they printed ostentatiously on their notepa per" (Chandavarkar 1998:74) .
One obvious benefit to workers of union ization is the availability of strike funds. The best-funded unions were the English. Turner (1962:122) wrote that the English unions were very mindful of the need to provide even non-unionized workers strike funds to minimize the potential for strikebreaking. In a 1903 textile strike in Lowell, Massachusetts, too, the union paid out strike benefits even to workers who had joined the union only after the strike began (DeVault 2004:50) . For the most part, Indian unions had no financial resources to support striking work ers or provide any other benefit to workers (Mukhtarl935).
There was one exception to this general rule. The Girni Kamgar Union of Bombay, organized by middle-class communists, had a short-lived period of real prosperity. The union was registered on May 23, 1928, with just 174members (Newman 1981:189) . But the workers had come to trust and admire the communists during the April-October 1928 general strike, and the GKU quickly grew during the period between the end of the 1928 strike and the beginning of the April-September 1929 general strike. The average membership between October and March was 58,000, about half the Bombay work force. And GKU members actually paid their union subscriptions, so that when the 1929 strike began the union had an income of Rs. 94,374 (Newman 1981:216) . But this 6The British measure is based on Turner's (1962) estimates for cotton industry employment (700,000) and union membership (400,000) in 1913 (pp. 22 and 25, respectively).
7There were 30,795 union members in the cotton tex tile industry (Kumar 1961) Another role of unions is to resolve uncer tainty. Leadership can credibly inform the rank and file as to the true state of business conditions, and the fact that there is a rec ognized union signals workers' ability to act collectively. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, greater unionization might actually lead to fewer strikes. This might explain why English workers struck less frequently than Indian workers, but showed tenacity when they did strike. It is interesting that England's strikes, which were largely by unionized workers, were longer, more cohesive in terms of workers' participation, and more duration-dependent than those in India or the United States.
On this point, it is noteworthy that the one region in India in which there was a strong labor organization, Ahmedabad, lost the fewest worker days to strikes. By 1924 the Textile Labour Association (TLA) of Ahmedabad, originally organized by Gandhi, represented 14,000 members, about a fourth of Ahmedabad's work force, and that figure roughly doubled by 1930. More important, it commanded significant resources, much of which had actually been donated by mill owners sympathetic to Gandhi's political cause. These resources allowed the TLA to involve itself in the day-to-day life of the workers through its many social welfare activities. In this case, the comparatively short duration of the strikes, an average of 5.9 days as opposed to a Presidency average of 9.9, and the relative lack of worker cohe sion in the Ahmedabad strikes, the average mill work force participation rate being 34% compared to the Presidency average of 46%, may counter-intuitively indicate the strength of the union, rather than its weakness. This is because the union leaders, who were not workers but were educated, middle-class sup porters of Gandhi, saw their role as mediators between the workers and the mill owners, and tried to defuse hostility. The leaders opposed strikes in principle, and believed they should only be used as a very last resort (Patel 1987; Mukhtar 1935 Gandhi could have averted the devastating general strikes in Bombay of 1928 Bombay of , 1929 Bombay of , 1932 Bombay of , and 1934 Yes, there would have been mutual confidence on both sides, if things were managed in a different way. The only thing was that if Gandhiji had come down to Bombay to form the Bombay Trade Union Association and had as much influence over the Maratha section of the community here as he had on the Gujarathi section in Ahmedabad, then it would have been worth, I should say, above a crore of rupees. (Bombay 1938-40:3907) Stones's employer, Sir Victor Sassoon, "had instructed him to meet 'the devil himself if he had the confidence of the workers and could deliver the goods." But though Stones had met with the titular leaders of the Bom bay unions in 1928 and 1934, he testified that "no one could deliver the goods," and these strikes could not be averted (Bombay 1938-40:3624,3908 ).
To more fully understand Stones's frustra tion, it is useful to describe in detail one of the general strikes of Bombay. The strike of 1919 is the purest in that it was the first strike to involve over 100,000 workers and it predated any unionization. In India, as in many countries, there was severe inflation during the First World War, which was not fully offset by wage increases, and labor was restive. The strike began as a wage dispute in one mill of 2,500 workers and was orga nized by the jobbers of that mill. (Jobbers were Indian workers who were responsible for staffing a section of the mill.) When the manager of the mill did not treat the jobbers with respect, on the morning of January 9, 1919, the 2,500 workers marched to the other mill owned by the same family, and after a brief and peaceful demonstration, the workers of the second mill joined the strike. Such spontaneous coordination is not unusual. What is unusual, however, is what happened next. The striking workers "proceeded systematically through the textile mills of Parel and other industrial districts, persuading the workers in each case to quit work and join their ranks." Newspaper ac counts described the procession as "orderly and well behaved," and estimated the number of men congregated by the evening as greater than 100,000.
The strike ended when the mill owners announced a 20% wage increase on January 21, 1919 . Note that this concession had been negotiated not by a worker organization, but rather with the assistance of Commissioner of Police C. A. Vincent, who had been born in Bombay and was fluent in Marati. Leading jobbers had contacted Vincent on the first day of the strike to seek his intervention, and at a later point he met with a delegation of 300 jobbers and other leaders to more clearly un derstand the workers' demands. The Kamgar Sabha, a middle-class organization devoted to the betterment of the workers, also met with workers, but the workers attributed the victory to Vincent (Kumar 1971 ).
There were similar very large strikes in Britain and the United States. Britain had about a dozen textile strikes involving 100,000 workers or more (Turner 1962:28) . The first was in 1878, the last in 1932, and among the others was a one-week industry-wide strike in 1919 over issues very similar to those in the Bombay strike. But the English strikes were undertaken by an almost completely orga nized labor force. Even in 1878 the union was strong. Beatrice and Sidney Webb wrote that after 1869 the Lancashire Cotton Operatives "began to be reckoned as an integral part of the Trade Union world" (Webb 1920:307) .
This was largely because the workers had by then been able to force employers to adopt standardized piecework rates, something they had been trying to achieve since the beginning of the century. In the United States, even the largest U.S. cotton textile strikes involved fewer than 20,000 workers before 1934. But the General Textile Strike of 1934 was the largest strike in U.S. history to that point, and involved well over 400,000 workers. This strike was also very different from the large Indian strikes. It was called by the United Textile Workers. Their August 14 vote to stage the strike was announced over a nation-wide broadcast, and the workers walked out peacefully on the day appointed by the union (Lahne 1944:226) . This nar rative reinforces the statistics. It shows that unorganized Indian workers could initiate a very large strike in as orderly and complete a manner as the most organized examples in English and U.S. labor history. Unorganized Indian workers could not, however, indepen dently negotiate a settlement.
But if England's extensive unionization is perhaps an explanation for the lower strike frequency in England than in India, how can we explain the relative strike frequency in the United States? In those limited cases in which the U.S. strike was sanctioned by a union, cohesion and success improved, as discussed earlier. But the great majority of U.S. workers were unorganized, and the great majority of strikes occurred without union involvement. U.S. strikes were also similar to Indian ones in their want of success, and U.S. strikers presented an even less united front than Indian strikers. If these condi tions led to high strike frequencies in India, why were there so comparatively few strikes in the United States?
A Model of Cohesive Behavior
Could it be that something in the culture of Indian workers allowed them to mimic unionized behavior in the absence of West ern-style unions? In 1893, Tom Drewet, a former manager of one of the leading Bombay mills, testified, The institution known to Western nations as a trade union, with its printed rules and regula tions, its subscriptions and regular accounts, is represented here by an unnamed and unwritten bond of union among the workers particular to the people. (Great Britain 1893:132) What was this bond? Mancur Olson (1965) argued that a group may solve the free-rider problem associated with providing a public good (such as the gains from striking) by instituting private benefits accessible only to members. The private benefits create the bond, and the provision of the public good will be almost a "by-product" of the organi zation. The true loss to members from not participating in collective action is not the forgone opportunity of potentially achieving the public good; it is the actual loss of the private benefit. Thus the Webbs wrote in 1897 that "the prospect of securing support in sickness and unemployment is a greater inducement to join the union ... than the less obvious advantages to be gained by the trade combination" (Booth 1995:71) .
Although Indian unions furnished little more than nominal oversight of strike com mittees, historians describing the Indian labor force have stressed the social networks that bound workers together (Chandavarkar 1998 (Chandavarkar ,1994 Newman 1981 Newman ,1979 van Wersch 1992; Patel 1963) . The networks would stem initially from kinship, caste, and village ties, and then expand to co-workers and other ten ement neighbors. These ties were important in finding a job, sustaining workers before permanent employment, and providing for the worker in any downturn or sickness. They provided insurance in a risky environment, much as did the benevolent society activities of the English trade unions. I will argue that the need to preserve good standing in these networks may have provided Indian workers with sufficient incentive to maintain the cohesion evidenced by the strike data.
Consider the case of a worker who breaks with his fellows who have chosen to strike over a wage decrease. Suppose they win the strike. While it may be true that the strikebreaker subsequently receives the same wage as the strikers even though he did not bear the cost of the strike, he will have lost the benefits of belonging to the social network.
My arguments fit well with the observations of J. M. Campbell, a former manager of a large Bombay mill. In 1892 he ascribed the bond between the mill workers to the threat of boycotting to prevent individual workmen in any branch of factory labour consent ing to accept wages lower than what that form of labour has hitherto commanded. This secret influence, though little more than "in the air," is powerful. I believe it has much to do with the prolonged maintenance of what seems to me a monopoly or almost a monopoly wage. (Great Britain 1893:128)8 8Of equal interest for my argument is that Campbell contended that the workers were likely to form a union soon, as they were already exhibiting union-like behav To formalize this discussion, consider a society of n workers. The probability of employment is p. If the worker is employed, he receives wage w. Assume, for simplicity, that the wage available in other employment is zero. A proportion g of the workers be long to a "group." Employed members of this group donate an amount s to their less fortunate neighbors. These funds are col lected together and disbursed to unemployed group members. Non-members of the group receive nothing. If in any period a worker who is employed refuses to share, he is cast out of the group and does not have access to the donated income in subsequent periods of unemployment.
Suppose for simplicity that the workers live indefinitely. (This assumption isjustified because death occurs randomly and without forewarning and because in Indian society one's standing with the group determines one's children's standing with the group. Their expected income is
Note that the amount shared out of wages, s, does not affect the value of expected income. Thus, if the workers are risk-neutral and only concerned with the level of their expected income, they will have no incentive to share (or not to share).
It is reasonable to argue, however, that in the situation of extreme poverty and minimal ior. "Individual workers allow their wages to be cut for objects which their caste or community hold worthy of support. A meeting is called and subscriptions collected to repair a rest-house, dig a well or reshrine a god in some up-country village."
savings seen in India, textile workers would be not risk-neutral, but risk-averse. Then the standard result would obtain that the expected utility from an uncertain income, as opposed to the expected income itself, would be greater in a situation of sharing than in a situation of non-sharing. Risk aversion oc curs because the marginal utility of income is diminishing. Thus the expected utility from receiving w with probability p and 0 with probability (1 -p), for all potential values of p, must lie below the expected utility of receiv ing at minimum something above 0, even if that means the maximum will be something below w, as would occur in a sharing situa tion. Expected utility for the risk-averse is greatest when s is set equal to 1/2 of w, that is, income is the same whether the worker is employed or unemployed.
Risk-averse individuals' discounted ex pected lifetime utility will be higher for group members than for non-group mem bers because each period's expected utility is greater for members than for nonmem bers. Therefore the discounted sum of each period's expected utility must be greater for members than for nonmembers. As long as this difference in discounted expected utility streams is greater than the benefit of cheating in any one period, where cheating is defined as a group member refusing to share, and as long as all parties expect all other parties to share, and punish anyone who does not share, sharing will be a mutual best response.
It is easy to incorporate even costly par ticipation in other group endeavors into this framework. Strikes are one example. Suppose the "group" chooses to strike. As before, let the cost to an individual of a strike of duration t be c. t. As long as this cost is less than net value of the discounted stream of expected insurance payments in subsequent periods, group membership will still be optimal, and so the worker will join with his group in the strike.
Social Organization in Interwar India and Late-Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts
In the model presented above, sharing is one sustainable equilibrium. Not sharing at all would be another. Bendor and Swistak (2001) determined that some degree of co operation may be sustained in the absence of binding institutional supports if there is a social network sufficiently dense that everyone knows who has cooperated and who has not, if there are sufficiently severe penalties for cheating, and if punishment is multilateral; a failure to cooperate with any one individual must lead to retaliation by the entire group. The level of cooperation chosen will depend on what players expect other players to do. Greif (1994) pointed out that these beliefs, which he modeled as players' a priori probability distribution over potential equilibrium strategies, depend on existing norms predetermined by culture.
This model can explain the higher relative strike frequencies in India than in the United States only if cooperation among workers, defined in terms of both income sharing and group punishment, was more encouraged by Indian culture than by U.S. culture.
Late-nineteenth-century New England textile workers were a disparate group of native-born and immigrants from different countries. I will refer again to DeVault's discussion of the Lowell, Massachusetts, 1903 textile strike. The labor force included native born men and women, French Canadians, Greeks, Portuguese, Poles, Armenians, and Syrians. DeVault described how each group lived separately within Lowell. Though they all supported the strike, before each strike action they always first met in their respective ethnic or gender groups. Regarding another strike, this one in 1898 New Bedford, DeVault makes a similar observation: "Both gender and ethnicity overlay and were intertwined with occupational, organizational, and politi cal differences" (DeVault 2004:180 What of interwar Indian mill workers' social norms? Their cultural beliefs were formed in their villages. Even in Bombay Island, the most urbanized area in India, as late as 1931 only about 25% of cotton textile mill hands had been born in the city (Morris 1965, Table 8 ). Indian village life was highly stratified spatially and socially by caste groups (Marriott 1955 ). While it is well known that individual castes provide income support for their members (Srinivas 1962) , and Munshi and Rosezweig (2006) showed the importance of individual caste groups in the social insurance networks of industrial workers in modern Bombay, the mills in my study employed workers from many castes. Successful strikes would have required cross-caste cooperation. The pro nounced caste divisions present in Indian villages might suggest that they would be infertile ground for the formation of attitudes of general cooperation. But anthropologist Pauline Kolenda (1978) argued that in the villages of colonial India, the caste system provided "organic solidarity." Within the village, and extending beyond in economic systems that included other nearby villages, the castes were interdependent. Each had a protected role in the economic order and a claim on the wealth produced by the village. This relationship is called the jajmani system in much of India, and the baluta system in Maharashtra, the state that includes Bombay and from which the majority of the Bombay textile mill labor force was drawn.9 While a 9Colonial Indian villages and the divisions of labor that existed there have been variously described as "moral" full discussion of Indian village conventions is obviously outside the scope of this article, I wish to establish here that sharing income within the village was the norm, that there were accepted methods of informally adju dicating deviations from social norms, and that punishments for these deviations was multilateral.
The most important form of income shar ing was money lending, which was ubiquitous in village India. The wealthy were expected to lend money. And while they quite often profited from this activity, they were also expected to grant extensions in difficult periods (Mayer 1965) . In a study of income smoothing in modern South Indian villages, Rosenzweig (1988) found a similar pattern.
He reported that informal loans from wealthy farmers, employers, shopkeepers, and so on were an important component of average expenditure, equivalent to approximately 58% of the value of mean profits from crop production. Further, these loans, typically in travillage, were more than four times as large as transfers from extended family relations.
Kinship and caste ties were significant, but not quantitatively as important as village ties.
Many historians and anthropologists (Chakrabarty 1989; Newman 1979; Rowe 1973) argue that Indian workers recreated village institutions, including patronage net works, in urban mill compounds. 10 Newman (1979) argued that the jobber was the main agent of patronage. Jobbers sometimes went into the village to recruit, but all that was usually necessary was for the jobber to be "known in the village." Newly arrived work ers would come to him in search of work, lodging, and credit. "In practice, therefore, each mill hand was part of a limited labour market that operated through personal re lationships as well as through a cash nexus, a labour market that was bounded by verti and "exploitative." Determining which description is more accurate is a major issue in Indian history and his torical anthropology (Appadurai 1984; Dirks 2001 cal ties of patronage" (Newman 1978:282) .
Newman argued that personal ties to jobbers explain why workers tended to enter or leave employment in groups, and also why the ubiquitous badlis?new migrants to the city hoping to become textile workers but not yet employed?could not successfully be used as strikebreakers.11 Mukhtar (1935:15) wrote that though mill owners had tried to break the kinship and village ties of workers by bring ing in workers from outside, "the newcomers usually joined the rank and file shortly after their arrival. " In Bombay, the workers had to associate themselves with a patron. Newman argued that the natural patron to associate themselves with was the jobber.
It should be noted, however, that the ex istence of jobbers' groups cannot by itself explain strikes. Bellwinkel (1973) surveyed construction labor groups in Delhi 1970. The recruitment proceeded just as Newman outlined for interwar textile workers, and workers were very loyal to their jobber. Jobber groups lived together in the site compound, cutting across village and caste connections.
But in construction, management was able to pit one jobber group against another to limit strikes. I am aware of no similar cases of strikebreaking "groups" in textiles.
The transient nature of the construction compounds versus the more settled mill apartment blocks may partially explain this. Chandavarkar (1994) argued that the mill neighborhoods formed cohesive, supportive communities. He also wrote that neighbors dispensed justice as well as credit. In some cases the apartment block or chawl would form a committee to represent tenants in disputes with the landlord or to settle disputes between neighbors. They were headed by the most influential members of the block, and had the right not only to settle disputes, but also to fine individuals violating the "Large numbers of unemployed workers would appear at each mill each morning in Bombay City. A manager noted in 1927 that 50 or 60 workers would congregate each day at his mill's gate (Morris 1965:137 These urban committees were also a trans plant from the village. There, each caste had its own panchayat, or council, over which the headman of the caste officiated, and disputes across castes would typically be brought to the "influential people of the village" (Majumdar 1958:99) . Cases taken up by the caste-pan chayat deal with land disputes, with personal matters that would lower the reputation of the caste (for example, irregular unions and family quarrels), and with other disputes between caste members (Majumdar 1958) . Hutton (1963:89) wrote that "poaching on the 'practice' of a fellow-casteman would be a proper subject for the caste panchyat." The panchayat had other functions, such as planning community festivals, reforming the sub-caste, or jati, customs, and?one that strikes me as particularly relevant?"devel oping community strategy for dealing with the dominant caste, or with the police, or government agents" (Kolenda 1978:89) .
(The "dominant caste," a phrase apparently coined by M. N. Srinivas, is the caste holding political and, typically, economic sway over the village.) The decisions of the panchayats are upheld by the group. The punishment meted out for grievous violations of caste rules is to "deprive a casteman of the right to receive water, or the tobacco pipe, from the hands of his fellow castemen and forbid them likewise to receive it from them." This effectively expels him from the community. He will not receive help in time of difficulty.
There will be no one for his children to marry (Hutton 1963:106) . Kolenda (1978:11) wrote that the resulting "social control of members is unusually strong and effective." Ranajit Guha (1983:190-91 ing Indian workers. First, note that the model suggests that the labor force would exhibit the most cohesive firm-wide behavior in those cases in which the group is large relative to the society of workers. The "group" is those workers who have ties of mutual obligation. In large cities, not all workers at a mill would necessarily be interconnected socially. But mills in the outlying regions were drawing on local labor. There, the mill's entire labor force would be an interconnected group. I take it as support for the model that strikes lasted longer in the upcountry than in Bom bay City?an average of 16.8 days versus 11.4 days, respectively. Moreover, strikes brought out a larger fraction of the mill's work force in the upcountry (a median of 71%) than in Bombay City (40%).14 Next, the model indicates that workers' total incomes, which include group supple ments, will remain stable in the face of dis turbances such as unemployment or strikes as long as the group's overall resources are large relative to the forgone income. I can cite two cases in which this appears to have held. The Office of the Labour Commis sioner for the Central Provinces and Berar collected budget data for textile workers in Nagpur between December 15, 1941, and August 10, 1942 . Due to the accidental loss of 121 budgets of textile workers, a second set of budgets was taken in the latter half of 1942. There was a strike from August 15 to about October 10, 1942. "As regards the expenditure of these 121 families, it does not seem to have been affected by the strike. In fact, it turns out to be practically the same as that of the remaining 291 textile Mahar families" (India 1944 ). The Bombay Cotton Textile Strike of 1982-83, studied by van Wersch (1992) , had a similar effect on work ers' incomes. Although it occurred some fifty years later, in many ways this strike paralleled the General Strikes of the interwar period. It 14One might conjecture that the length and cohesive ness of upcountry strikes were due to underreporting in the outlying areas. Perhaps only the more severe strikes were being reported. This appears to be unlikely, however, as the percentage of one-and two-day strikes in India as a whole was 17, whereas in the upcountry it was 21.
may seem odd to suppose that the behavior of workers in the 1920s and 1930s could be similar to that of workers in the 1980s, but I believe it was. The workers still came from roughly the same villages. They still followed roughly the same pattern in terms of the ages at which they arrived in Bombay, the way they found jobs, their housing and support once they were in Bombay, and even how they distributed their money between expenses and remittances. Among his sample of 150 workers, van Wersch (1992:343-44) found that 37% did not experience a "change of lifestyle" during this very protracted strike. when "the money-lenders and shopkeep ers were encouraged to add their support" (Newman 1981:127) . The second general strike was begun in January 1920, but ended abruptly on February 2. The mill hands claimed, 'The banias [money lenders] had allowed them one month's additional credit from the beginning of the strike and they had held out as long as their credit had lasted" (Newman 1981:137) . In both the 1925 and the 1928 general strikes, the Labour Office estimated that between 50,000 and 60,000 of the workers, about half the strikers, returned to their home villages, even though these were hundreds of miles away. A lesser but still very large number left during the 1929 strike (Newman 1981:157, 202, 245 One explanation for the high strike frequencies consistent with the data is that Indian workers had a low cost of cooperation but there were no recognized labor leaders to negotiate their demands. The Indian workers appear to have formed groups that were tightly knit but leaderless. These groups had the effect of decreasing the delay cost of striking without providing management with a responsible negotiator. This notion is given some support because the one region in India with effective labor leadership, Ahmedabad, actually evidenced the fewest worker days lost to strikes. What sustained strikers in India? At least theoretically they could have been sustained by an unusually high cultural norm of co operation created and reinforced by the need to supply social insurance. Historians describe the informal credit networks of In dian workers, and anthropologists describe the means by which these same networks can bind behavior. Thus that theory is consistent with the historical record of Indian workers.
What do these historical Indian strike data suggest about the general applicability of modern strike theories? First, they reinforce the notion that credible labor leadership can play a positive role in decreasing strike incidence. Second, they suggest that the absolute level of uncertainty may be less important in determining strike incidence than are the particular cultural norms of the workers, for these norms determine how workers coalesce in an uncertain en vironment.
